Kaleidescape leaves Hollywood blu in the face

Well, here we go again. With its five-year litigation with the DVD Copy Control Association over its original DVD jukebox still not resolved, Kaleidescape Systems on Tuesday announced plans to roll out a new disc player that will import high-def movies from Blu-ray Discs onto Kaleidescape home media servers, along with conventional DVDs and CDs. The new player, the M500, won’t actually ship until May 18, which gives the studios (or the Advanced Access Content System Licensing Administrator, the Blu-ray equivalent of DVD-CCA) a week to try to file a new suit and persuade a court to issue a temporary restraining order preventing the M500 from shipping.

Assuming they decide to sue, that is. On the face of it, Tuesday’s announcement by Kaleidescape would seem to invite a very similar lawsuit as the one DVD-CCA filed against the company back in 2004. As it did with its original DVD system, Kaleidescape secured all the necessary technology licenses needed to build a Blu-ray player, including a license for the AACS copy-protection system. Also as with the CSS copyright protection system for DVDs, Kaleidescape maintains the AACS license does not, as a legal matter, prohibit the copying of Blu-ray discs, at least not in the manner by which Kaleidescape creates a hard-drive copy of the movie.

In the case of DVDs, of course, the DVD-CCA, which oversees the CSS license, had a very different interpretation of what was and was not permitted under the license agreement, and sued Kaleidescape in California state court for breach of contract on grounds that the Kaleidescape player violated the provisions in the license agreement that prohibit copying.

In April 2007, however, the trial court found that the rules purporting to prohibit copying were not actually part of the CSS license because they were contained in a separate document that was not incorporated by reference into the main license agreement. That finding rendered the question of whether Kaleidescape had actually violated the rules moot — you can’t be in breach of what’s not in the contract — so the court never decided the question.

DVD-CCA appealed the decision and in August, the California Court of Appeal overruled the lower court, declaring that the rules regarding copying were, in fact, properly part of the contract. Since that was the only question before it, however, the appeals court also reached no decision on whether Kaleidescape had actually violated the rules. Instead, the case was sent back for a new trial to determine whether in fact the rules prohibit copying and whether in fact Kaleidescape is not in compliance with those rules. Read More »

RealNetworks' real mistake

One week  after Judge Marilyn Hall Patel decisively threw out its antitrust claims against the studios and DVD CCA in the RealDVD case, RealNetworks appears to be imploding. On Wednesday COO John Giamatteo abruptly left the company, and on Thursday founder Rob Glaser stepped down as CEO (he’ll remain chairman). Although Glaser’s move had apparently been planned for some time, it came sooner than he expected and appears not to have been voluntary.

While it’s possible the timing of the events is just a coincidence I wouldn’t bet on it. Investors cheered the news of the Glaser move, sending the stock soaring 17 percent in its wake (ouch!), presumably in anticipation of a new strategic direction for the company–one not quite as provocative and confrontational with respect to the content owners.

The whole RealDVD saga, in fact, has been a disaster for Real. Not only has it been unable to distribute the product, thanks to a restraining order and temporary injunction by the court, but the litigation with the studios over the DVD copying software has produced an unending series of legal setbacks for Real, of which last week’s ruling is merely the latest. Read More »

Redbox, RealDVD and Hollywood’s long struggle with consumer demand, Part II

In my last post, I discussed the Hollywood studios’ long history of being willing to frustrate consumer demand in order to maximize their own profit, or at least to do what they believed would maximize their profit. For decades, in fact, it defined their basic business model: starve demand in one window or market to boost it in another.

In ordinary businesses, continuously frustrating consumer demand would not be a very effective business plan. But under the artificial conditions of the copyright monopoly it has generally worked for the studios over the years. When some innovator came along and found support in the Copyright Act for a model to meet consumer demand without giving primacy to studio profits, such as video rental stores, the studios’ first instinct has been to suppress it, often by litigation or seeking new legislation, or failing that through monopoly pricing.

It’s a deeply ingrained habit.

From the bunker of their copyright monopoly, however, the studios have often misidentified their own self-interest, at least at first. The video rental market, after all, went on to become hugely profitable for them, despite their unease with it. Yet the old habit is stubborn.

DVD, for instance, was the most successful format for distributing movies to the home ever devised. And it achieved that success largely by overcoming the studios’ historical ambivalence and meeting consumer demand head on. It didn’t eradicate the rental market but by meeting consumers’ reasonable expectations for purchasing a movie–in terms of price, convenience and quality–DVDs fundamentally changed consumer behavior to the benefit of the studios.

It wasn’t enough to change studio behavior, however. As later technological innovation caused consumer expectations and behavior to change again, the studios effectively did nothing to respond. DVD prices that once seemed reasonable, for instance, came to seem less reasonable over time as consumers’ expectations of value changed. Yet prices largely stayed where they were. Read More »