Mirror Mirror

Netflix’s content chief Ted Sarandos once famously quipped that his goal was for Netflix to become HBO “faster than HBO can become us.” By that he meant, for Netflix to establish itself as a high-end global TV content brand before the reigning high-end global TV content brand, HBO, could un-tether itself from the legacy pay-TV ecosystem.

So far, Netflix is winning that race. The streaming service now reaches over 100 million subscribers worldwide, more than the entire U.S. pay-TV universe, and will spend upwards of $8 billion in 2018 producing 700 original series.

What’s more, Netflix has successfully colonized HBO’s home turf in the living room. Although today you can watch Netflix on virtually any connected device nearly anywhere in the world, the company reported this week that 70 percent of its streams are delivered to a stationary TV set, either directly via smart TV app, via streaming box, or via its growing number of integrations with traditional pay-TV platforms.

For its part, although HBO has successfully launched an over-the-top version of itself, HBO Now, it remains anchored to the legacy economic system of the pay-TV business.

A similar dynamic is now playing out across the entire TV ecosystem. As digital brands, from Netflix to Hulu to Amazon, grab a growing share of viewers’ time and subscription dollars, legacy TV brands are racing to remake themselves in digital TV’s image.

Last week, Fox Networks Group ad sales chief Joe Marchese told a private gathering of advertising and brand executives that the broadcaster would like to shrink the ad load in its programming to 2 minutes per hour by 2020, down from the current average of 13 minutes per hour for broadcast channels and 16 minutes for cable networks.

That follows on a similar announcement by NBCUniversal that it plans to reduce the number of ads in its prime time pods by 20 percent. Time Warner’s Turner networks have also been experimenting with lighter ad loads and plan to expand the program over the next three years.

“The whole goal is to make TV look more like digital TV,” NBCU’s executive VP of entertainment ad sales Mark Marshall told Digiday.

The efforts don’t end with lighter ad loads. Speaking at a Deutsche Bank investor conference this week, CBS COO Joseph Ianiello said the drive to become more digital is changing how the network invests in content.

The network is ramping up its investment in original content for its direct-to-consumer OTT service CBS All Access, with six to seven new series planned for this year on top of the new Star Trek series it launched last year. According to Ianiello, CBS views the increased spending as an investment in subscription growth for CBS All Access, rather than in the typical series P&L, much as Netflix views its content spending.

“If we were managing the content for margin, we would have sold Star Trek to Netflix domestically, we would have not spent as much money on content,” he said. “We would have sold all of our shows into domestic syndication.”

Will it work? Given the accelerating pace of cord-cutting and collapsing valuations among pay-TV providers, the networks have little choice but to try. But the timing of their investments and strategic shifts will be critical, and they have little room for error.

YouTube Under Fire

YouTube. What is it good for?

Not for making a living, apparently. According to new research by Matthias Bärtl of Offenburg University of Applied Sciences in Offenburg, Germany, 96.5 percent of YouTubers trying to make money from their videos won’t earn enough from advertising to exceed the official U.S. poverty line of $12,140 a year.

That’s in part due to YouTube’s low advertising rates, but mostly due to the fact that a tiny slice of videos grab nearly all of the views. According to Bärtl, 3 percent of most-viewed channels in 2016 attracted almost 90 percent of all views.

There’s a broken heart for every “like” on YouTube.

While Bärtl’s research may say more about the unwarranted expectations of most YouTubers than about anything YouTube itself is doing, another new study this week cast the Google-owned site in a more sinister light.

Last week, YouTube came under criticism after a video promoting a conspiracy theory about 17-year old David Hogg, a survivor of the school shooting in Parkland, Fla., who emerged as a prominent representative of the students pushing for stricter gun laws, became the top trending clip on the platform.

But according to research published this week by Jonathan Albright of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism, the promotion of the smear against Hogg was the predictable result of YouTube’s design.

A search for “crisis actor” videos by Albright returned several hundred results. He then obtained the “next up” recommendations for each, yielding a network of nearly 9,000 related conspiracy-themed videos.

While crackpots and abuses have long found a home on YouTube (as well as other social-media sites) Albright argues in a post on Medium that the design of YouTube’s recommendation algorithm, as well as its own financial interests, all but guarantee that conspiracy-theory videos like the attack on Hogg will get promoted.

Every time there’s a mass shooting or terror event, due to the subsequent backlash, this YouTube conspiracy genre grows in size and economic value. The search and recommendation algorithms will naturally ensure these videos are connected and thus have more reach.

In other words, due to the increasing depth of the content offerings and ongoing optimization of YouTube’s algorithms, it’s getting harder to counter these types of campaigns with real, factual information.

I hate to take the dystopian route, but YouTube’s role in spreading this “crisis actor” content and hosting thousands of false videos is akin to a parasitic relationship with the public. This genre of videos is especially troublesome, since the content has targeted (individual) effects as well as the potential to trigger mass public reactions [sic].

That’s a tough charge, but not the only one YouTube faced this week. On Tuesday, CISAC, the international confederation of author’s rights organizations, released a study prepared by University of Texas economist Stan Liebowitz examining the impact of the safe harbor provisions in the Digital Millennial Copyright Act and their counterparts in the European Union’s E-Commerce Directive on music rights holders, taking particular note of YouTube’s reliance on those protections.

While much of Liebowitz’s analysis simply rehashes rights owners’ long-standing complaints about YouTube’s alleged “value grab,” albeit with a scholarly gloss, his report ups the ante by leveling a new charge: YouTube’s Content ID system, which Google touts as providing rights owners the tools to monetize their content that appears on the site, ain’t all its cracked up to be, or could be.

Although copyright owners should have a duty to provide YouTube with information about their copyrighted works before they could claim copyright infringement, once such information were provided, normal copyright law, without the safe harbor, would provide the proper incentives for YouTube to make sure that its Content ID worked better than any alternative…One of the main impediments to this solution, however, is Google’s incentive, which is to make YouTube’s voluntary filtering system only accurate enough to silence critics of its treatment of copyright holders, as opposed to actually eliminating infringing files…

If Google wants to claim to be going above and beyond the requirements of the DMCA, it is merely necessary for it to provide a Content ID system that works moderately well, since any such system is voluntary. In fact, it would be surprising if Content ID worked as well as Google could make it, since such a Content ID system would weaken YouTube’s bargaining position with the copyright holders with whom it does business.

If Content ID worked as Google suggests, meaning almost perfectly, copyright owners who thought they were being underpaid by YouTube would remove their material from YouTube since YouTube’s users would no longer have access to those copyrighted works, as Google claims in the above quote. As we shall soon see, however, the current Content ID system is insufficiently accurate to remove YouTube’s superior bargaining position, which is why YouTube is fighting to keep the safe harbor which it would not need with a more accurate Content ID system.

That’s pretty close to an allegation of bad faith.

And if all that weren’t enough, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been asking questions of YouTube’s parent company, Alphabet, about how it reports the video site’s financial results.

YouTube’s public relations staff has its work cut out for it.

Disney Sees Red Over Ruling on Download Codes

Ever since sales of DVDs and Blu-ray Discs began their long eclipse behind the rise of more convenient digital alternatives the Hollywood studios have sought ways to extend the life of the high-margin disc business by finding ways to integrate disc sales with the broader digital economy.

The most systematic effort was the UltraViolet initiative. By creating an UltraViolet account, consumers could register their purchase of a DVD or Blu-ray Disc and obtain access to a digital version of the same movie, which they could then stream to connected devices without a DVD or Blu-ray drive, via participating streaming services.

Disney, which never joined the UltraViolet consortium, had its own version it called Disney Movies Anywhere (now re-christened simply Movies Anywhere and incorporating most of the former UltraViolet studios). Disney packaged its discs with an insert containing a code, which, when entered by the consumer in her online Movies Anywhere account allowed her to stream the movie through participating online services, or to download the movie onto up to eight registered devices.

DVD rental kiosk operator Redbox has likewise struggled with consumers’ declining appetite for DVDs and Blu-rays. It’s main strategy has been to keep its rental prices extremely low, which has often put it at odds with the studios, who by and large would prefer to see the low-end rental market wither away. But Redbox, too, has sought ways to make itself digitally relevant.

It’s solution? Unbundle what Disney had bundled.

While some studios have made a reluctant peace with Redbox and sell discs directly to the kiosk operator Disney has not. To obtain Disney titles, Redbox has been forced to purchase inventory through other retail channels, often in the form of Disney Combo Packs, which include a DVD, a Blu-ray Disc, and an insert with the code for Disney Movies Anywhere.

As part of its digital relevance efforts, Redbox started breaking up the combo packs, repackaging the Movies Anywhere insert in its own packaging, and offering the download codes for sale through its kiosks, at a discount to the price of the disc. Disney objected, but lacking any contractual vendor relationship with Redbox it had no leverage to stop it. So the studio sued the kiosk operator for copyright infringement.

“When Redbox’s customers download Copyrighted Works using a Code purchased from Redbox, they do so without authorization and in violation of Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under copyright, including the right of reproduction,” Disney claimed in its complaint. “Redbox is contributorily liable for copyright infringement because it (a) has knowledge that its customers will be reproducing the Copyrighted Works without authorization when they use the Codes to download copies of those works, and (b) induces, encourages, or materially contributes to the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights through its unlawful resale of the Codes.”

The suit also charged Redbox with breach of contract for violating the “terms and conditions” it claims govern the purchase of the Combo Packs, which purport to prohibit transfer of the codes.

This week, a federal district judge in California dealt the studio a serious setback in the case by declining to issue an temporary injunction to stop Redbox from selling the codes.

Worse for Disney, the judge concluded that the studio had engaged in copyright misuse, subjecting it to at least the remote danger of losing the right to enforce its copyrights on its movies, as Redbox is now demanding.

According to Disney, the codes represent a limited license to distribute the movie, not the sale of another copy, governed by the terms and conditions of the Movies Anywhere service (along with those of the related service RedeemDigitalMovies.com). Those terms state that consumers are only authorized to use the codes if they are currently the owners and in possession of the physical discs the codes were packaged with. Anyone who obtained and used the codes separately, therefore, is violating the terms of the license and thereby infringing Disney’s copyright.

According to the court, however, “There can be no dispute [per the first sale doctrine] that Disney’s copyrights do not give it the power to prevent consumers from selling or otherwise transferring the Blu-ray discs and DVDs contained within Combo Packs. Disney does not contend otherwise. Nevertheless, the terms of both digital download services’ license agreements purport to give Disney a power specifically denied to copyright holders by § 109(a)…This improper leveraging of Disney’s copyright in the digital content to restrict secondary transfers of physical copies directly implicates and conflicts with public policy enshrined in the Copyright Act, and constitutes copyright misuse.” (Emphasis added.)

As to Disney’s claim that transfer of the codes violates the shrink-wrap license governing the Combo Packs, the court dismisses the language on the outside of the packaging as insufficient to establish an enforceable contract.

While the facts of the case are new, the situation is not. Disney’s real concern here is not copyright infringement as such, it’s the business model implications of severing the download codes from the physical discs.

The codes are a one-time pad. They can’t be re-used once they’ve been entered the first time, so transfer of a code does not result in any more copies than Disney itself has authorized. They can’t be used to circumvent technical protection measures on other copies. They’re simply a product key.

The problem for Disney is that bundling of the codes with the discs is intended to enhance the value of the discs as an incentive to purchase. If the codes can be obtained and used without having to purchase the discs, that incentive is undermined. Why buy the cow when you can get the milk without it?

Selling the codes at a discount could also undermine the market for streams and downloads in downstream windows.

But a copyright is not a guarantor of the copyright owner’s preferred business model. It’s a limited grant of specifically enumerated exclusive rights.

What Disney is trying to do in this case is to use copyright law to try to prevent outcomes adverse to its preferred business model. But its preferences are not among those exclusive rights.

We’ve seen this movie before. As far back as 2002, a group of studios sued SonicBlue over its Replay TV DVR, arguing that by automating consumers’ own ad-avoidance behavior somehow amounted to copyright infringement, an argument Fox revived more than a decade later in its unsuccessful lawsuit against Dish Network.

It’s a bad habit that invites skepticism of legitimate copyright claims. Copyright owners do themselves no favors by falling back on it.

Modernizing Music Licensing

Just before Christmas, a bi-partisan group of lawmakers introduced the Music Modernization Act, which, among other things, would create a new blanket license for mechanical reproduction rights to musical compositions and establish a new entity to collect and distribute mechanical royalties.

The bill is meant to address one of the abiding sources of friction within the digital music streaming business. Musical compositions in the U.S. are subject to a compulsory mechanical license, meaning anyone can record a song and sell copies of that recording by sending a notice of intent (NOI) to the composition’s copyright owners and paying a per-copy royalty set by the Copyright Royalty Board.

Unlike the public performance right, however, where performance rights organizations (PROs) like ASCAP, BMI and SESAC aggregate millions of compositions and offer a blanket license covering their entire repertoires, anyone availing themselves of the compulsory mechanical license is required to identify and pay the appropriate copyright owners individually. Where the copyright owners cannot be identified or located, the user can file the NOI with the U.S. Copyright Office and the royalties paid are held in escrow until the rights owners are located.

The system worked well enough for many years when it was rare for anyone or any outlet to make bulk use of the mechanical reproduction right. With the rise of digital streaming, however, which has been held to implicate both the public performance and the mechanical reproduction right, the lack of an efficient system for administering mechanical rights has been a constant source of tension, between digital service providers like Spoity and Apple Music on the one hand, and music publishers and songwriters on the other.

That tension has frequently erupted into litigation, including the $1.6 billion lawsuit filed against Spotify in December by Wixen Music Publishing over Spotify’s alleged failure to pay required mechanical royalties.

Should it become law, the Music Modernization Act could go a long way toward easing those tensions. Since it’s introduction, in fact, the bill has gained broad support throughout the industry. In a rare show of unity, a group of more than 20 industry organizations representing music publishers, songwriters, record labels, PROs, and service providers issued a joint statement earlier this month endorsing the bill and urging its passage.

Much of the credit for the bill’s introduction and for rallying support behind it belongs to the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) and its CEO David Israelite, who worked closely with the bill’s sponsors on Capitol Hill and helped broker the joint statement. Israelite will sit down with me for a special fireside chat at Digital Entertainment World on February 5th to discuss the Music Monetization Act, as well as other issues facing the industry, including the music industry’s notorious data challenges, and the future of performance rights licensing in the wake of recent court cases.

This week, we asked Israelite a few preliminary questions to set the stage for his fireside chat:

Concurrent Media: Last week, a group of music industry organizations jointly endorsed the Music Modernization Act, the Classics Act and the AMP Act. To what do you attribute the sudden outbreak of cooperation among so many different stakeholders?

David Israelite: We have a window of momentum and consensus that is ripe for action. Congressional leaders like Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte, who retires this year, has made copyright reform a priority, and with songwriter champions like Rep. Doug Collins (R-GA) and Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) offering consensus bills like the MMA – and the Senate hopefully following suit – there is a real opportunity to move legislation that will significantly help the future of songwriting. Additionally, the MMA is not a wish list for music publishers and songwriters – it is a bill that took months to negotiate because it helps both the tech and music industries. No one got everything they wanted – but both sides are better off with the MMA. DiMA, which represents the biggest tech companies in the world is supportive, as are the biggest songwriter groups in the U.S.

Largely because of the momentum around the MMA – the music industry has coalesced around other music bills that will help legacy artists and producers. As I have always said – we are stronger together – and we have a great opportunity to not just help our segment of the pie – but to advance the whole creative class. After years of trying to develop and unite around reasonable reforms, it is truly exciting that today we stand together and that Congress is invested in these changes as well.

Where do you think the debate over the BMI/ASCAP consent decrees goes now in the wake of the 2nd Circuit decision?

BMI’s win sends a strong message that the DOJ cannot simply reinterpret decades of industry practice and upend the lives of thousands of songwriters. The new leadership in DOJ’s antitrust division hopefully offers a new path forward, and I believe they are looking at the consent decrees with fresh eyes. My hope is that they will ultimately abolish them altogether and give songwriters the free market that other intellectual property owners enjoy.

3) What is NMPA’s position on the various PRO database initiatives (ASCAP/BMI; ASCAP/SACEM/PRS)?

The PROs currently offer searchable repertoires. Their efforts to create a single database will bring clarity to the industry – however these initiative will take time and money. I look forward to seeing their progress in the coming months.

Click here for information on how to register for Digital Entertainment World.

Explaining Blockchain With Cats

When Satoshi Nakamoto introduced Bitcoin into the world, whoever he, she, or they were set the total number of coins that can ever be released (“mined” in Bitcoin parlance) at 21 million. While individual bitcoins can be sub-divided into an infinite number of smaller units (fractions of bitcoins), the total whole number of units is finite.

CryptoKitties fat cat Mack Flavelle

That inherent scarcity is one of the reasons for the dizzying run-up in the price of bitcoins: At any given time there is a fixed number of bitcoins in the world.

The key to establishing that scarcity is the blockchain, which leverages cryptography to ensure that individual bitcoins (and their subdivisions) are unique, identifiable, unalterable, and un-reproducible. Unlike the internet, where sending a digital file from one computer to another inescapably involves creating a new copy, bitcoins themselves are not really “sent” or transferred over a network so there is no need to create a copy. Instead, the shared ledger that records ownership of bitcoins is updated to reflect the new network address (i.e. owner) of a cryptographically unique asset on the network.

Those properties, of uniqueness and scarcity, are part of what has attracted many artists to blockchain technology. What is unique and scarce can have and hold value, and what has value can be bought and sold, traded and collected, or held as an asset in the expectation of appreciation.

Getting people who are not steeped in cryptography and are accustomed to the infinite reproducibility of digital files on the internet to become familiar and comfortable with the concepts of digital scarcity and uniqueness, however, is a challenge. Without that buy-in from consumers, the blockchain hopes of many in the media and creative industries could be broken.

It was that challenge that Mack Flavelle and his team of developers at AxiomZen set out to tackle. Their solution? Cats.

The team came up with a collection of digital illustrations depicting goggle-eyed, cartoon cats they called CryptoKitties and created an online game allowing people to buy, sell and collect CryptoKitties using Ether. The game also leverages smart contracts to make the kitties “breedable,” based on their unique “DNA,” creating new, unique CryptoKitties.

Why cats? While there are other blockchain-based digital collectibles on the market, most are targeted at limited audiences, such as RarePepes, based on the adopted alt-right mascot Pepe the Frog. Flavelle’s goal was to appeal to a broader market and introduce ordinary consumers to digital collectibels. “Cats are part of the internet,” Flavelle tells RightsTech.  “People are already familiar with the idea of trading cat videos.”

Trading in CryptoKitties has been robust. At one point, it became the dominant application on the Ethereum network, to the annoyance of others trying to use the network.

According to a third-party site that tracks sales of CryptoKitties, some virtual kittens have sold for the equivalent of more than $100,000, based on the then-current value of Ether.

Flavelle, who’s title is Fat Cat, will sit down for one-on-one fireside chat with me on February 6th, as part of the RightsTech track at the Digital Entertainment World conference in Los Angeles.

We’ll discuss the origins of CryptoKitties, what their creators have learned about the market for digital collectibles, what their popularity portends for consumer adoption of blockchain-based applications, and whether CryptoKitties are a fad or will prove to have nine lives.

Click here for information on registering for Digital Entertainment World.


Nothing Neutral About Disney’s Bid For Fox

It was fitting, albeit likely coincidental, that the Walt Disney Co. announced its $52 billion acquisition of most of the movie and TV assets of 21st Century Fox on the day the Federal Communications Commission voted to repeal its own net neutrality rules, because the deal is very much about the future of content delivery over the internet.

Disney CEO Robert Iger

Under the deal, Disney would absorb the 20th Century-Fox film and TV studio and its library, including the first three “Star Wars” films; most of Fox’s cable networks group, including National Geographic, FX, and 300-plus international channels but excluding Fox News or Fox Sports; and 22 regional sports networks (RSNs). The deal also includes Fox’s one-third interest in Hulu, giving Disney majority control over the streaming service.

Assuming the deal passes antitrust muster — highly likely given Rupert Murdoch’s closeness to Donald Trump — it will give Disney control over vast new libraries of content as it prepares to significantly expand its direct-to-consumer streaming business. Strategic control over Hulu will also give Disney a solid foundation from which to challenge Netflix and Amazon directly as an over-the-top content aggregator.

Yet, while the coming showdown with Netflix has grabbed most of the headlines about the deal, there is another important streaming dynamic likely to play out that has gotten less attention but which could be directly impacted by the repeal of the net neutrality rules.

Whether, or not, the bulked up Disney succeeds in challenging Netflix and Amazon, its growing direct-to-consumer ambitions give the Mouse a major stake in the coming contest between programming services and broadband providers over the terms and conditions of engagement on last-mile networks.

The over-the-top streaming business has so far developed very differently from traditional movie and television delivery businesses. In the traditional TV business, the owners of the last-mile pipes — cable and satellite operators, local broadcast affiliates — pay program providers for access to their content.

Disney, in particular, has been successful in leveraging that dynamic, earning ESPN the highest per-subscriber carriage fees of any cable network.

Unlike a cable TV system, however, internet access networks have utility and value independent of any particular content, allowing access service providers to build their networks — and subscriber bases — without having to pay for the content moving across those networks.

If anything, the monopoly or duopoly status most internet access providers enjoy within their footprints has raised concerns that ISPs could use the leverage of their control over their networks to compel content providers to pay for access to their subscribers.

The FCC’s original Open Internet Order was designed in part specifically to deny ISPs that leverage, by prohibiting the blocking or throttling of data based on its source, or accepting compensation for favorable treatment of data from a particular source. Those rules left the status quo in place, at least for the time being. But they left open the possibility that the streaming business could eventually develop more like the traditional TV business, in which access providers are compelled to

The FCC has now voted to lift those rules — their ultimate fate awaits the outcome of inevitable litigation — potentially upsetting the current balance of power.

Determining who will ultimately holds the leverage in that balance remains a work in progress, however. One way to read Disney’s bid for Fox is as an attempt to position itself not only against Netflix but against last-mile network operators for the inevitable battles ahead.

From that perspective, the real trigger event for Disney was AT&T’s (still pending) acquisition of Time Warner. Assuming that deal goes through, it will mean that two of Disney’s (and Fox’s) major competitors — NBCUniversal, now owned by Comcast, and Time Warner — will be owned by major broadband providers. That could leave Disney at a disadvantage in the struggle for leverage over the terms of OTT distribution.

One option would have been for Disney to sell itself to a network operator. But the only one out there with the scale to do it and not already betrothed is Verizon, and Verizon execs have made it clear they’re not in the market for a major studio.

By buying Fox, Disney is hoping to gain enough scale as a content provider to treat with network operators on equal or better terms.


Amazon, Google And The Great Game

For the better part of the 19th Century, the British Empire and Czarist Russia (and for a while Napoleonic France) struggled for influence and control over Afghanistan and the broader Islamic Central-Asian region. Russia feared England’s growing commercial ambitions on the doorstep of the Russian Empire, while England feared that Russian control of Afghanistan would allow it to threaten India, the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire.

Although the European powers never went to war against each other directly over the region, they engaged in a decades-long series of political and diplomatic moves and counter-moves (and occasional indirect military moves) that historian came to call The Great Game.

Something like a 21st Century version of the Great Game is now playing out among today’s digital empires for control over virtual territory on the connected devices and streaming services in Americans’ homes. Read More »

Pay-TV’s Rising Sea Of Troubles

Change comes slowly, and then all at once. And it’s coming now to the pay-TV business.

For years — even as technology-driven disruption ravaged the music, publishing, and other media industries — the traditional pay-TV bundle largely held together despite a trickling away of subscribers to cord-cutting.

A big reason it hasn’t fallen apart until now is that programmers and operators shared in interest in keeping it together, even as they regularly clashed over carriage renewals. For programmers, bundling channels into a single carriage deal brings in incremental affiliate fees and increases advertising inventory; for operators, the big bundle helps sustain high ARPU rates and long-term subscriber contracts. Neither side had an incentive to fundamentally alter the structure of the business.

Even the emergence of over-the-top “skinny” bundles proved less disruptive than many expected as programmers successfully pushed OTT providers to fatten up their skinny offerings and raise prices to levels nearly comparable to traditional pay-TV subscriptions.

But the trickle of cord-cutting has now become a flood. And as the water rises programmers and operators have begun to turn on each other in earnest. Read More »

Skinny Bundles vs. Set-Top A La Carte

Having resigned themselves to a future defined by cord-cutting, TV programmers are desperately trying to hold the line on bundling. The virtual-MVPD movement started by Dish Network’s Sling TV service began by trying to split the difference between the bloated traditional pay-TV bundle and true a la carte by offering a slimmed down package of channels at a lower price.

Since then, as more vMVPDs have launched to challenge Sling programmers have used their leverage to push up both the heft of the bundles and price tag, to where “skinny” bundles increasingly resemble what they aimed to replace, albeit at a somewhat reduced price.

That strategy isn’t cutting it with many cord-cutters, however. According to MoffettNathanson analyst Craig Moffett, virtual-MVPD subscriptions are so far making up only about 60 percent of the losses from consumers cutting the traditional cord, a trend Barclays analyst Kannan Venkateshwar sees continuing. Over the next decade, Venkateshwar projects, 31 million traditional pay-TV subscribers will cut the cord, but only 17 million will sign up for an internet-delivered bundle.

Assuming internet-delivered bundles are still around in a decade, that is. “Most of these [vMVPD] businesses are at best break-even or money losers,” Moffett told Bloomberg. “This is shaping up to be a truly lousy business.”

The a la carte on-demand subscription business, on the other hand, is shaping up nicely. Set-top streaming box maker Roku this month reported 15 million active monthly accounts, a 43 percent year-over-year increase and more than all virtual-MVPDs combined. The privately held company generated nearly $400 million in revenue in 2016 and reportedly is preparing to file for an initial public offering later this year at a roughly $1 billion valuation.

Notably roughly $100 of that $400 million in revenue last year came not from hardware sales but from its media and licensing business, which includes ad sales on Roku channels and fees it charges networks to be featured on the platform.

Roku isn’t alone on the set-top, either. According to eMarketer, Roku 38.9 million Americans will use Roku at least once a month in 2017 (including multiple users per active account), up 19 percent over last year, followed closely by Google’s Chromecast, at 36.9 million, and Amazon’s Fire TV, at 35.8 million.

One reason for that growth in connected-device usage is the growth in the number of U.S. households subscribing to more than one over-the-top subscription VOD service.

According to a recent study by Hub Entertainment Research 38 percent of U.S. TV households now subscribe to two or more SVOD services such as Netflix, Amazon and Hulu. That’s up from 26 percent last year. Some 14 percent of households subscribe to all three major services, up from 6 percent a year ago.

Not all of those SVOD subscribers have cut the cord, of course, but anyone who is subscribing to all three major services is paying about as much per month for them as they would for a skinny bundle. If consumers can be said to vote with their dollars they’re voting for a future that is on-demand and a la carte, not just over-the-top.

Hollywood’s Summer of Discontent

Hollywood has a long history of chasing too much of a good thing. Once a studio has a major hit with a certain kind of movie, every other studio copies the blueprint and starts churning out their own versions. Think disaster movies in the 1970s, or slasher films in the ’80s. Eventually, creativity gives way to formula, viewers grow numb from the repetition and audiences move on, leaving the studios facing a couple of down years as they clear their pipelines of genre pictures nobody wants to see anymore. The cycle then usually starts up all over again.

This summer, domestic audiences seem to have lost their taste for big-budget franchise films and sequels. Ticket sales were down 9 percent from last summer through the July 4th weekend as latest installments of aging franchises fell flat, from Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Men Tell No Tales and Transformers: The Last Knight to Alien: Covenant and Universal’s The Mummy reboot. New would-be franchises, meanwhile, such as Warner’s King Arthur: The Legend of the Sword and Paramount’s Baywatch, never found open water. Read More »

High Court Of Canada Cooks Google’s Goose

When you think about landmark legal rulings affecting the internet you don’t usually look to the courts of Canada. But the Supreme Court of Canada this week sent shock waves through internet legal circles by issuing an injunction against Google requiring the search engine to de-index an allegedly infringing website everywhere in the world.

The 7-2 ruling was surprising on multiple levels, not least because Google is not actually a party to the litigation that led to the injunction. More surprising still was the court’s assertion of global jurisdiction over the internet. But for Google the worst may be yet to come.

The dispute involves Equustek Solutions, a smallish Canadian technology firm that sued its former distributor, Datalink Technologies Gateway, in 2011 alleging that Datalink was relabeling some of Equustek’s products and passing them off as its own. Then, according to the suit, Datalink used confidential documents and information it had obtained from Equustek to produce and sell competing products. Read More »

VidAngel Calls Hollywood’s Bet

The Hollywood studios have a fraught history with third-party services that re-edit their films, typically to remove the sort of content that had earned the film an R or even PG-13 rating.

Back in the 1990s, a handful of video rental store operators, mostly in conservative Utah, began manually editing purchased copies of VHS cassettes for their customers as a service, most famously with Titanic, to remove the the naughty bits. Studios and filmmakers grumbled but manual re-editing wasn’t exactly a business designed to scale so Hollywood mostly let it be.

In the 2000s, with the advent of the DVD format, some of those same entrepreneurs figured out ways to partially automate the editing process and tried to turn it into the business. In 2000, the Utah company CleanFlicks started producing cleaned up versions of DVDs created by muting the audio at key points or removing entire sections of the audio track, then offering them for sale and rental. Read More »

M&E Forecast: Slowing Growth, Tighter Choke Points

Two five-year forecasts issued this week together paint a picture of a much tougher business environment facing media and entertainment companies over the next half decade.

According to PwC’s annual Outlook report, the media and entertainment industries are nearing a revenue “plateau,” particularly video-centric industries, as many historical growth drivers are running out of steam. Worldwide, PwC expects M&E revenue to rise from $1.8 trillion in 2016 to $2.2 trillion in 2021, representing a compound annual growth rate of 4.2 percent– a ratcheting down from the 4.4 percent CAGR it forecast last year.

For the U.S., revenue is projected to grow even more slowly, increasing from $635 billion in 2016 to $759 billion by 2021, for a CAGR of 3.6 percent. Read More »

Fool Me Twice: How Spotify Could Become the New iTunes Store

Back in 2003, as the music industry was reeling from widespread, Napster-fueled piracy, Apple CEO Steve Jobs made the record labels an offer they couldn’t resist: Give me a license to sell individual tracks but let me sell them cheap enough to be a viable alternative to free, and I’ll wrap them in DRM for you in a way that consumers will accept, so they can’t be copied.

The labels leapt at the deal and the $1.00 download became the new atomic unit of the business.

Though thrilled at first to have an answer to piracy the record companies eventually came to rue the arrangement once they figured out that Apple was using those inexpensive downloads to supercharge the market for its high-margin iPods and later iPhone hardware, and was reaping far more of the value being created by their music than they were. By then, however, they had become captive to Apple’s ecosystem: Thanks to Apple’s proprietary DRM, the only way to sell music to iPod users — at the time the largest segment of the portable music-player install base — was through iTunes, under terms effectively dictated by Apple. Read More »